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INSIDER TRADING LAW THAT WORKS: USING
NEWMAN AND SALMAN TO UPDATE DIRKS’S
PERSONAL BENEFIT STANDARD
Mark Hayden Adams
I. INTRODUCTION
Wall Street corruption, particularly insider trading, has captured
the imagination of the American public since the 1980s.1 While the
most egregious cases of insider trading often grab headlines, 2 there is
confusion and disagreement about exactly what constitutes illegal
insider trading.3 Imagine this: a prosecutor has solid evidence that an
investment banker tipped inside information4 to his brother, who, in
turn tipped his brother-in-law, who traded on the information and
pocketed a cool $1.7 million.5 In addition, the evidence shows that

 J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.F.A., University of
Delaware, Professional Theatre Training Program; B.M., Indiana University, Jacobs School of
Music. I would like to thank Professor Elizabeth Pollman for her guidance and insight and the
editorial staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their diligence, particularly Kristin
Haule and Lilian Walden. I would also like to acknowledge my wife Stefania Vitali-Adams and
my children Kyler and Gemma for their unwavering support and encouragement.
1. Hollywood studios produced a string of popular movies based on Wall Street
manipulations starting in the 1980s, including most notably Wall Street (1987) (insider trading),
but also Trading Places (1983) (commodities future trading), Working Girl (1988) (mergers and
acquisitions), Other People’s Money (1991) (corporate takeover), Barbarians at the Gate (1993)
(leveraged buyout), Boiler Room (2000) (securities fraud), Margin Call (2007) (financial
recklessness), and coming back full circle to Wall Street: Money Never Sleeps (2011) (moral
hazard). Usman Hayat, Top 20 Films About Finance: From Crisis to Con Men, CFA INST.
(Sept. 20,
2013),
https://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/09/20/20-finance-films-for
-entertainment-and-education.
2. See, e.g., Anita Raghavan, Lust for Zeros, N.Y. TIMES MAG., May 17, 2013, at MM30
(discussing United States v. Gupta, 747 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1841
(2015)).
3. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928
(2014) (“Deep confusion reigns over federal insider trading law, even over the essential elements
of an insider trading violation.”).
4. While it is often referred to simply as “inside information,” the accurate term is “material
nonpublic information” and courts often examine whether the information tipped was indeed
“material.” See, e.g., SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848–51 (2d Cir. 1968) (en
banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
5. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015).
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all parties were fully aware that the activity was illegal. 6 The brotherin-law even tried to hide the trades in a friend’s account.7 The
prosecutor handily wins the case, but the defendant appeals all the
way to the Supreme Court, claiming to be innocent because the
government did not prove that the investment banker received a
pecuniary benefit when he tipped his brother and that the defendant
knew of such a benefit.8 To many laypersons, this may sound like
further proof that “the law is an ass.”9
Unlike many other countries, the United States has no federal
statute defining and prohibiting insider trading.10 Instead, insidertrading prohibitions have been developed through common law
interpretations of Section 10(b) of the 1934 Exchange Act, and of
SEC Rule 10b-5, one of the regulations issued pursuant to it, which
was adopted in 1942.11 The results have been uneven, particularly in
recent years.12 At issue lately has been the question of the “personal
benefit” received by the insider who tips the information, also known
as the “tipper.” (The person who receives the tip is known as the
“tippee.”) The tipper’s personal benefit is a required element of a
violation.13
In 2012 in SEC v. Obus,14 the Second Circuit reversed a
summary judgment order against the SEC, holding that evidence of a
college friendship between the tipper and the tippee was a sufficient
inference to send to the jury the question of whether the tipper
received a personal benefit from the tip.15 But in 2014 in United

6. Id. at 1089.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1090.
9. These words were uttered (more or less) by Mr. Bumble in Charles Dickens’s Oliver
Twist. But the notion was not new to Dickensian characters. In 1654, the phrase “the law is such
an ass” was found in Revenge for Honour, published by George Chapman, and possibly written
by playwright Henry Glapthorne. The Law Is an Ass, PHRASE FINDER, http://www.phrases.org
.uk/meanings/the-law-is-an-ass.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2016).
10. Richard W. Painter, Don’t Ask, Just Tell: Insider Trading After United States v.
O’Hagan, 84 VA. L. REV. 153, 211–12 (1998).
11. Kim, supra note 3, at 935. The “SEC” is the commonly used acronym for the Securities
and Exchange Commission.
12. Compare SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012) and United States v. Salman, 792
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015), with United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
13. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983) (holding that the prohibition against insider trading is
based on the insider’s breach of fiduciary duty in tipping the information, which generally
includes some kind of personal benefit obtained by the insider/tipper).
14. 693 F.3d 276 (2d Cir. 2012).
15. Obus, 693 F.3d at 279.
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States v. Newman,16 the Second Circuit seemed to reverse itself—
although it did not state that it was doing so—by holding that a
personal benefit cannot be inferred “by the mere fact of a
friendship,” but must be established through “proof of a
meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange
that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential
gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”17 In addition, the
Newman Court held that the government must prove both that the
tipper received a personal benefit and that the tippee knew that the
tipper received the benefit.18 These requirements have made it much
more difficult for prosecutors to bring cases forward and to win
them.19 Consequently, the government petitioned the Second Circuit
to review the case en banc, but was denied.20 Subsequently, the
government petitioned the Supreme Court to review the case, but
again, the Court denied the request.21
In 2015, Judge Jed Rakoff of the Southern District of New York
sat by designation on the Ninth Circuit in Salman, the case in which
the insider tipped his brother, who tipped his brother-in-law.22 No
longer bound by the Second Circuit’s decision in Newman, Judge
Rakoff held that Newman did not intend to overturn the landmark
Supreme Court insider trading case, Dirks v. SEC.23 Indeed, the
Second Circuit was required to follow the Supreme Court, and
therefore any interpretation of Newman must be in concert with
Dirks.24 Dirks held that insider trading violations are based on the
breach of fiduciary duty by the original tipper (the “insider”), and
that this breach of duty is met where an “insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.”25 Judge
Rakoff therefore rejected Salman’s argument that the government
needed to prove that the investment banker received a personal
16. 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
17. Newman, 773 F.3d at 452.
18. Id. at 453.
19. David I. Miller, Putting the Brakes on Newman: 3 Recent Rakoff Decisions, LAW360
(July 30, 2015, 3:46 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/684440/putting-the-brakes-on
-newman-3-recent-rakoff-decisions.
20. Brief of Petitioner-Appellee at 1, United States v. Newman, No. 13-1837(L), 131917(CON), 2015 WL 1064423 (2d Cir. Jan. 23, 2015).
21. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 242
(2015).
22. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088 (9th Cir. 2015).
23. Id. at 1093.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1093 (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983)).
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benefit—it was enough that he tipped inside information to his
brother as a gift.26
After the Supreme Court denied certiorari in Newman, some
commentators predicted that the Court would find Salman a better
case to determine the issue of a personal benefit.27 In fact, in 2014
Justice Scalia welcomed the opportunity to hear an insider trading
case so that the Court could clarify this area of law.28 On January 19,
2016, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear Salman.29 Less
than one month later, on February 13, 2016, Justice Scalia died, and
his absence will likely significantly change the dynamics of the
Court and create an opportunity to revisit earlier holdings.30 The
Court should take this opportunity to reverse Dirks’s holding that a
personal benefit is required to show a breach of fiduciary duty.31
While a personal benefit examination is often useful, by making it a
required element, the Court made it too difficult for the judicial
framework of insider trading to comport with congressional intent as
expressed through the creation of the SEC.32 In addition, the Court
should eliminate the Newman requirement that the tippee must have
knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit.33 There is much at stake
in the Court’s upcoming decision. On one side, there is a world of
Wall Street market analysts who routinely talk with corporate
insiders to “ferret out” information about a company to determine the
value of its stock.34 These analysts’ findings quickly filter down to
traders, resulting in much more accurate pricing of securities.35 As
such, they provide information that is integral to the proper
26. Id. at 1094.
27. Walter Pavlo, The Insider Trading Case the Supreme Court Wants to Hear, FORBES
(Jan. 25, 2016, 9:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2016/01/25/the-insidertrading-case-the-supreme-court-wants-to-hear/#222220562788; Stephen Bainbridge, Insider
Trading at the Supreme Court: With Newman Down, Will Salman Go?,
PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM
(Oct. 9,
2015),
http://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2015/10/insider-trading-at-the
-supreme-court-with-newman-down-will-salman-go.html.
28. Whitman v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 352, 354 (2014).
29. Ed Beeson, High Court Takes on Insider Trading Benefits Case, LAW360 (Jan. 19, 2016,
10:18 AM ET), http://www.law360.com/articles/747762/high-court-takes-on-insider-trading
-benefits-case.
30. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html.
31. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
32. See infra Part II.
33. Unites States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 449 (2d Cir. 2014).
34. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
35. Id. at 658–59.
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functioning of the market, and they need to be able to perform their
work without fear of breaking the law.36 On the other side, the
government must have tools to prosecute those, like Salman, who
willfully trade on inside information.
This Note proceeds as follows: Part II chronicles the
development of insider trading law, from the Great Depression
through today, including the policy issues that have guided both
legislators and judges. Part III examines in detail the policy problems
with recent judicial decisions, as well as the inherent conflict
between the mission of the Securities Exchange Commission and the
Supreme Court’s holding in Dirks. Part IV proposes solutions to the
current problem with insider trading liability and demonstrates how
the solutions would solve the problem. Part V justifies the proposal.
Part VI concludes.
II. STATEMENT OF EXISTING LAW
A. Brief History of the Securities and Exchange Act
After World War I, there was little appetite for a federal system
of market regulation.37 The roaring ‘20s were full of promises of
“rags to riches” transformations by investing in the stock market, and
most investors failed to consider the systemic risk that came from
widespread abuse of margin financing (investing borrowed money)
and unreliable information about the securities in which they were
investing.38
When the stock market crashed in October 1929, however,
public confidence in the markets crashed as well.39 Both large and
small investors, and even the banks that had loaned to them, lost
massive amounts of money in the Great Depression that followed.40
For the economy to recover, the public would need renewed faith in
the markets, and Congress held hearings in search of a solution.41
Based on its findings, Congress passed the Securities Act of 1933
and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), which
36. Id. at 658; see also A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the
Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 936 (2003).
37. What We Do, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about
/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
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created the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).42 The
acts were intended to restore investor confidence in the capital
markets by ensuring that investors would have access to reliable
information and that there were clear rules of honest dealing.43
Most insider trading prosecutions are based on violations of two
laws: Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5. In
§ 10(b), Congress made it unlawful “[t]o use or employ in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention” of
rules promulgated by the SEC.44 In Rule 10b-5, the SEC made it
unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates . . . as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.”45 Interestingly, although
§ 10(b) was intended as a “catch-all” clause to prevent fraudulent
practices, neither the statute nor the pursuant regulations expressly
prohibits insider trading.46
B. The Seminal Insider Trading Cases
1. Straightforward Insider Trading: Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. in 1969
The first insider trading case in modern judicial history, SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,47 was relatively simple.48 Corporate insiders
knew the company had just discovered a huge deposit of copper, zinc
and silver, but released a press statement that essentially denied it.49
Secretly, they purchased stock and options in their company and sold
it at a great profit after the news became public and the share price
rose.50 The Second Circuit found that the insiders violated § 10(b)
and SEC Rule 10b-5, noting that “[i]t was the intent of Congress that
all members of the investing public should be subject to identical

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5(c) (2016).
46. Unites States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 445 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 202–06 (1976)).
47. 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
48. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 976 (1969). This is widely considered a seminal case, even though it is from the Second
Circuit, not the Supreme Court. The Second Circuit handles a large portion of securities related
cases because it covers New York City.
49. Id. at 845.
50. Id. at 847.
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market risks.”51 Specifically, the court found that because the
insiders had access to inside information, they “were not trading on
an equal footing with the outside investors,” and Congress intended
to prevent this kind of inequity.52
By contrast, subsequent cases that have shaped the law of
insider trading have dealt with situations that were far more
complicated.53 More importantly, the idea that Congress intended
that “all members of the investing public should be subject to
identical market risks”54 was rejected in subsequent cases, most
notably by Justice Powell in Chiarella v. United States.55
2. The Classical Theory: Chiarella in 1980
The second major insider trading case was Chiarella v. United
States, which established what became known as the “classical
theory” of insider trading.56 Vincent Chiarella worked at a financial
printer, where he handled documents announcing corporate takeover
bids.57 Although the identities of the acquiring and target
corporations were withheld until the last minute, often Chiarella was
able to deduce them.58 Without disclosing his knowledge, he
purchased stock in the companies and sold his shares immediately
after the takeovers occurred, making a profit in excess of $30,000.59
He was convicted of violating § 10(b) and SEC Rule 10b-5.60 The
Second Circuit affirmed the conviction.61
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and began by examining
the trial court’s jury instruction, which allowed a conviction if the
51. Id. at 852.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224–25 (1980) (where the inside
information was deduced by a man who worked at a Wall Street print shop); see also Dirks v.
SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 648–49 (1983) (where the insider revealed information to a broker-dealer for
the purpose of exposing corporate fraud).
54. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 851–52.
55. 445 U.S. at 232 (rejecting the Second Circuit’s reasoning that the federal securities laws
“created a system providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and intelligent
investment decisions.”).
56. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (“Under the ‘traditional’ or
‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are violated when a corporate
insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic
information.”).
57. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 225.
61. Id.
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jury found that Chiarella “willfully failed to inform sellers of target
company securities that he knew of a forthcoming takeover bid that
would make their shares more valuable.”62 The Court observed that
§ 10(b) did not address whether silence may constitute a
“manipulative or deceptive device.”63
Next, the Court turned for guidance to an earlier influential case
at the SEC, In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,64 where the SEC held that a
broker-dealer’s duty to abstain from trading or disclosing the inside
information arose from “(i) the existence of a relationship affording
access to inside information intended to be available only for a
corporate purpose, and (ii) the unfairness of allowing a corporate
insider to take advantage of that information by trading without
disclosure.”65 Under this test, Chiarella could not be held liable
because neither the Second Circuit nor the trial court identified a
fiduciary relationship between Chiarella and the sellers of the
stock.66 Instead, the Court reasoned the SEC’s decision was based on
the belief that federal securities laws have “created a system
providing equal access to information necessary for reasoned and
intelligent investment decisions,” and therefore, any trading using
material nonpublic information was fraudulent.67
The Court rejected the “equal access” theory, also known as the
“fairness” theory.68 In fact, the Court held that to formulate such a
broad duty would “depart radically” from the “established doctrine
that duty arises from a specific relationship between two parties” and
should not be undertaken “absent some explicit evidence of
congressional intent.”69
The Supreme Court is free to overturn lower court decisions, but
62. Id. at 226.
63. Id.
64. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
65. Id. at 227 (citing Cady, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
66. Id. at 231–32. Although Chiarella was a stranger to the companies whose shares he
purchased, he was arguably an agent for the printing company. The SEC never advanced that
theory, and thus, the court declined to address it. In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger stated that
Chiarella was not operating in an arm’s-length transaction, because he had essentially stolen
inside information. Id. at 239–40 (Burger, C. J., dissenting). Justice Burger would read § 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 to mean that a person who has “misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading.” Id. (Brennan, J.,
concurring). It would take 20 years for the Supreme Court to recognize the misappropriation
theory in United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
67. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232 (1980).
68. Id.
69. Id. at 233.
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here, the Court did not even acknowledge the Second Circuit’s
finding in Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. that Congress did indeed intend to
ensure equal access to information when it passed the Securities and
Exchange Act.70 Considering the Second Circuit generally handles
most of the insider trading cases, it was odd to ignore a finding
regarding insider trading as clear as this: “[s]uch inequities based
upon unequal access to knowledge should not be shrugged off as
inevitable in our way of life, or, in view of the congressional concern
in the area, remain uncorrected.”71 Nevertheless, the Court found
Chiarella had violated no law and thus, reversed his conviction.
The Chiarella opinion was written by Justice Powell, who was
appointed to the bench in 1972 when he was sixty-four, and was
already a prominent corporate lawyer, as well as a former director of
eleven major corporations.72 Shortly before his appointment, he had
written a letter to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, entitled “Attack
of the American Free Enterprise System,” in which he warned of the
“present assault” on the enterprise system by communists, leftists,
and even voices “from the perfectly respectable elements of society:
the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary
journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians.”73 As a fierce
advocate of free enterprise, Powell likely considered “fairness
theory” to be in conflict with the free market ideals he championed.
3. Dirks v. SEC: Creating the Standard for Tipper/Tippee Liability
The third major insider trading case, and widely considered the
landmark decision in this area, was Dirks v. SEC, also written by
Justice Powell. The facts in Dirks were extremely unusual because
they involved massive corporate fraud.74 In 1973, Raymond Dirks, a
market analyst, received material nonpublic information from Ronald
Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America (“Equity”),
70. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851–52 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
71. Id.
72. Linda Greenhouse, Lewis Powell, Crucial Centrist Justice, Dies at 90, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
26, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/26/us/lewis-powell-crucial-centrist-justice-dies-at
-90.html?pagewanted=all.
73. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Confidential Memorandum: Attack of American Free Enterprise
Systems, PBS (Aug. 23, 1971), http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources
_document13.html (“The memo was written two months before President Nixon nominated him
to the Supreme Court. The memo is credited with inspiring the founding of many conservative
think tanks, including the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute and the Manhattan Institute.”).
74. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 649 (1983).
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that Equity’s assets were vastly overstated due to widespread fraud
within the company.75 Secrist stated that various regulatory agencies
had failed to act, despite charges made by other employees, and he
wanted Dirks both to verify the fraud and to disclose it publicly.76
Dirks investigated Equity and found lower level employees who
admitted the fraud.77 Although neither Dirks nor his firm owned any
shares of Equity, some of his firm’s clients did. Dirks discussed his
findings openly with them, and they sold their shares worth more
than $16 million, thereby avoiding substantial losses.78
Dirks urged the Wall Street Journal to write a story on the fraud
allegations, but the bureau chief did not believe such massive fraud
was possible and feared publishing a story that might be libelous.79
Shortly thereafter, Equity’s share price fell from $26 to $15, and
California insurance authorities discovered the fraud.80
The SEC found that Dirks had aided and abetted violations of
§ 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by repeating the allegations of fraud to
members of the investment community who later sold their shares.81
Although Dirks played an important role in exposing the fraud,82 the
SEC censured him because he gave material nonpublic information
about Equity to his clients, knowing that they would trade on it.83
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
affirmed. Judge J. Skelly Wright held that anyone who receives
material nonpublic information from an insider retains the fiduciary
duty to disclose before trading.84 Alternatively, Judge Wright found
that, as an employee of a broker-dealer, Dirks had violated his
obligations to the SEC and to the public, which were completely
independent of any obligations he acquired from Secrist’s tip.85
But at the Supreme Court, Justice Powell rejected Judge
Wright’s reasoning as essentially the same arguments the Court had

75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 649–50.
80. Id. at 650.
81. Id. at 651.
82. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 829 (1982) (“Largely thanks to Dirks, one of the most
infamous cases of fraud in recent memory was uncovered and exposed, while the record shows
that the SEC repeatedly missed opportunities to investigate Equity Funding.”).
83. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651.
84. Id. at 652 (citing Dirks, 681 F.2d at 839).
85. Id.
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previously rejected in Chiarella.86 The Court again rejected the
SEC’s theory that the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act
require “equal information” among all traders.87 In fact, Powell
intended to establish a carve-out for market analysts,88 claiming that
imposing a duty on analysts to disclose or abstain could inhibit them,
and that even the SEC recognized that analysts were necessary for a
healthy market.89 According to Powell, analysts routinely “ferret out”
and evaluate information they receive by meeting with corporate
officers and other insiders, and then determine the value of a
corporation’s security.90 The analysts’ judgments are then made
available to clients of the firm through newsletters, but, given the
nature of the information and the markets themselves, it would be
impossible to make the information available simultaneously to all of
the stockholders or the general public.91
At the same time, Powell knew a ban on insider trading was
essential; without it, corporate insiders would trade information for
cash or give it to the “stereotypical golfing buddy.”92 But he did not
trust the SEC to create the legal boundaries.93 He contended that the
duty to disclose advocated by the SEC would have no limiting
principle, and in a footnote he observed “[w]ithout legal limitations,
86. Id. at 656.
87. Id. at 657.
88. Professor Adam Pritchard has researched Justice Powell’s life and writings extensively,
including unpublished notes and dictations to his clerks, to better understand the Justice’s internal
process. Pritchard stated: “Powell’s experience as a corporate lawyer had left him with definite
views on the direction that the securities laws should take. In contrast to his reputation as a swing
vote in constitutional cases, Powell had profoundly conservative views on the proper scope of the
federal securities laws, and he pushed the Court toward holdings consistent with those views.”
A.C. Pritchard, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the Counterrevolution in the Federal Securities
Laws, 52 DUKE L.J. 841, 845 (2003).
89. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 658.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 658–59. One can’t help but wonder how applicable that assessment is today, when
information is released to the public with the click of a mouse, let alone in light of high-frequency
trading that occurs within microseconds, literally millionths of a second. In addition, Professor
Langevoort has questioned the value of analysts as applied to different investors in the market:
“[I]ntuition suggests that information generated by such multiservice firms will first find its way
to the firm’s own trading desks and its institutional clients, and only be filtered along to retail
customers after most of the opportunity for an informational trading advantage has disappeared.”
Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L. REV.
1023, 1026 (1990). In fact, in 2000 the SEC promulgated Regulation FD, which requires
simultaneous disclosure of information. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).
92. A.C. Pritchard, Dirks and the Genesis of Personal Benefit, 68 SMU L. REV. 857, 861
(2015). Professor Pritchard’s insight comes from Justice Powell’s notes to his clerk, James
Browning, regarding drafting the opinion, as well as memoranda for meetings with other justices.
93. Id.
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market participants are forced to rely on the reasonableness of the
SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as the facts of
this case make plain.”94
In the end, Justice Powell held that liability for insider trading
must be based on the insider’s (tipper’s) breach of fiduciary duty,
which required that the tipper receive a “personal benefit,” either
directly or indirectly, from the disclosure.95 Further, because a
tippee’s liability was derivative of the tipper’s liability, there would
be no liability for the tippee if the tipper received no personal
benefit.96 Lower courts were instructed to focus on objective criteria,
such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that would translate
into future earnings, which could be inferred by objective facts and
circumstances.97 In addition to these quid pro quo types of
relationships, a breach of duty could arise when an insider “makes a
gift” of material nonpublic information to a “trading relative or
friend.”98 There, it would “resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”99 Because Secrist,
the insider who tipped Dirks, was motivated by the desire to expose
the fraud and received no personal benefit, Dirks inherited no
liability, and thus, his conviction was reversed.100
4. United States v. O’Hagan: The Misappropriation Theory
The fourth major insider trading case was United States v.
O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997). This case established the
“misappropriation theory” that Justice Burger had contemplated in
Chiarella.101 O’Hagan was a partner at a law firm that was hired to
represent Grand Metropolitan for a potential tender offer for the
common stock of the Pillsbury Company.102 Although O’Hagan did
not work on the offer, he was aware of it, and he used material
nonpublic information he acquired through his firm to trade in call

94. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.24. Powell no doubt valued Dirks’ investigation into the alleged
fraud, and likely considered the SEC’s action to be misguided, because he believed Dirks’ goal
was to expose fraud, not to profit from inside information.
95. Id. at 662.
96. Id. at 664.
97. Id. at 663–64.
98. Id. at 664.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 667.
101. See United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 240 (1980) (Burger, J., dissenting).
102. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 647 (1997).
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options and shares, making a profit of more than $4.3 million.103
The SEC indicted O’Hagan for defrauding his law firm and its
client by using material nonpublic information for his own trading
purposes.104 In addition, O’Hagan used the profits to conceal his
previous embezzlement and conversion of unrelated client trust
funds.105 O’Hagan was convicted of violations of § 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.106
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed all of the
convictions, holding that liability under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5
could not be grounded on the basis of misappropriating material
nonpublic information he received through his firm, effectively
rejecting the “misappropriation theory.”107
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit and held that
criminal liability under § 10(b) could indeed be based on the
misappropriation theory.108 It reasoned that because the statute
proscribed using any deceptive device in connection with the
purchase or sale of securities in contravention of SEC Rules, it did
not confine its coverage merely to deception of a purchaser or seller
of securities.109 While the classical theory of a Rule 10b-5 violation
is based on the fiduciary duty that corporate insiders owe to their
shareholders,110 the misappropriation theory holds that a person
commits securities fraud when he “misappropriates” material
nonpublic information for trading purposes, “in breach of a duty
owed to the source of the information.”111
The court explained that under this theory, when a fiduciary
breaches a duty of loyalty and confidentiality to the principal by
trading on material nonpublic information for his own self-interest
without disclosing it, he “defrauds the principal of the exclusive use

103. Id. at 648.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 648–49.
107. Id. at 649.
108. Id. at 649–50. The Court observed in a footnote that twice before it had been presented
with the same question: first, in Chiarella, where the jury had not received instructions regarding
misappropriation, thus the court declined to address it; and second, in United States v. Carpenter,
484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987), where the court was evenly divided on misappropriation theory, partly
because it was such an unusual case—the misappropriated information did not come from a
company dealing in securities, but from the Wall Street Journal. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 n.4.
109. Id. at 651.
110. Id. at 651–52 (citing Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228).
111. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
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of that information.”112 The court reasoned that the two theories were
complementary, as each addressed efforts to capitalize on nonpublic
information through securities trading.113
Commentators have noted that Powell’s opinions in Chiarella
and Dirks were based on the common law of deceit, whereas
Ginsburg’s opinion in O’Hagan drew on the common law of
agency.114 But the broad scope of the misappropriation theory filled a
gap left by the classical theory, which otherwise would have
“severely undermine[d] the policy interests served by prohibitions
against insider trading.”115
C. Recent Cases: Interpreting the Dirks Standard
1. SEC v. Obus: Expanding Tipper/Tippee Liability
In 2012, the Second Circuit arguably expanded insider trading
liability in SEC v. Obus when it reversed a summary judgment ruling
against the SEC.116 Strickland then had a conversation with his
college friend, Peter Black, a hedge fund analyst, about
SunSource.117 Black told his boss, Nelson Obus, about the pending
acquisition, and Obus later purchased about five percent of
SunSource’s outstanding common stock for $4.75 per share.118
Eleven days later, the acquisition was publicly announced and the
price jumped to $9.50, representing a profit of $1.3 million for
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. A.C. Pritchard, United States v. O’Hagan: Agency Law and Justice Powell’s Legacy for
the Law of Insider Trading, 78 B.U. L. REV. 13, 17 (1998).
115. Id. Professor Pritchard further observed that Justice Powell petitioned his fellow justices
to grant certiorari in United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), the earlier case
based the misappropriation theory. Id. at 32. The Second Circuit had been developing the theory
through three cases, and Powell wanted to invalidate it, but by the time Carpenter reached the
court, he had retired, and the decision resulted in a 4-4 split. O’Hagan, written by Justice
Ginsberg, settled the matter in favor of the misappropriation theory. Unlike Justice Powell,
Justice Ginsburg had no corporate law experience. Before becoming a Circuit Judge, Justice
Ginsburg “was the director of the Women’s Rights Project for the ACLU and won five of the six
major cases on gender equality she argued before the Supreme Court including Reed v. Reed
(1973).” John Fox, Biographies of the Robes: Ruth Bader Ginsburg, PBS, http://www.pbs.org
/wnet/supremecourt/future/robes_ginsburg.html (last visited Mar. 14, 2016).
116. SEC v. Obus, 693 F.3d 276, 293 (2d Cir. 2012).
117. Id. at 280. The contents of the conversation were disputed. Id. The defendants
maintained that Strickland asked Black about Sunsource’s management as part of his due
diligence, whereas the SEC alleged that Strickland tipped Black with material nonpublic
information regarding the pending acquisition. Id. The Second Circuit deemed the disputed
conversations “genuine questions of fact,” that warranted reversal of the summary judgment. Id.
at 293.
118. Id. at 280–82.
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Obus’s fund.119
The Second Circuit held that the District Court erred when it
relied on an internal investigation at Strickland’s firm to determine
whether he had tipped Black in breach of a fiduciary duty, because
the investigation’s conclusions were contradicted by other evidence,
making it unreliable.120 It was a factual dispute, which therefore
required a jury to make a finding of fact.121 Further, the court held
that the undisputed fact that Strickland and Black were college
friends was sufficient to “send to the jury the question of whether
Strickland received a benefit from tipping Black.”122 The same
evidence created a question of fact as to “whether Strickland
intentionally tipped Black.”123 Moreover, the court held that it was
sufficient for a jury to conclude that Strickland “intentionally or
recklessly revealed material non-public information to Black,
knowing that he was making a gift of information Black was likely to
use for securities trading purposes.”124
Taken together, the court’s holdings regarding the college
friendship between Strickland and Black may have led prosecutors to
believe that evidence of a friendship, college or otherwise, would
satisfy the “personal benefit” element required for tipper liability.
2. United States v. Newman: Reducing Exposure
In 2014, the Second Circuit took another look at tipper/tippee
liability in United States v. Newman, and rejected the notion that a
tipper’s personal benefit could be inferred from a personal
relationship between the tipper and tippee, without more proof.
The facts of this case were complicated because they involved
several degrees of tipping from insiders at Dell and NVIDIA
regarding earnings numbers in advance of their public release. 125 The
information came through a tipping chain of three to four analysts,
who then passed the information on to hedge fund managers
Newman and Chiasson.126 They both traded on the tips and made $4
119. Id.
120. Id. at 291.
121. Id.
122. Id. This line of the opinion was likely the most troubling for those working on Wall
Street. It could be interpreted to mean that any conversation among friends regarding any security
could lead to liability on the ground that one party made a gift of inside information.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014).
126. Id.
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million and $68 million, respectively, in profits for their funds.127
Notably, because Newman and Chiasson were several steps removed
from the tippers, there was no evidence that either was aware of the
source of the inside information.128 Nevertheless, the Government
argued that Newman and Chiasson were criminally liable for insider
trading because, “as sophisticated traders, they must have known that
information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a fiduciary duty,
and not for any legitimate corporate purpose.”129 They were
convicted and sentenced to fifty-four months in prison, followed by a
year of supervised release, in addition to fines and forfeitures of up
to $5 million.130
On appeal, Newman and Chiasson argued that the jury
instructions were erroneous and, further, that there was insufficient
evidence to support their convictions.131 The court noted that
although the Government conceded that tippee liability required
proof of a personal benefit to the tipper, it claimed that it was not
required to prove that the appellants knew that insiders at Dell and
NVIDIA received a personal benefit in order to be found guilty of
insider trading.132 Instead, “consistent with the district court’s
instruction,” it claimed it merely needed to prove that the
“defendants traded on material nonpublic information they knew
insiders had disclosed in breach of a duty of confidentiality . . . .”133
In support, the Government cited Dirks for the “proposition that the
Supreme Court only required that the ‘tippee know that the tipper
disclosed information in breach of a duty.’”134 In addition, the
Government cited dicta in other cases where the court described
elements of tippee liability “without specifically stating that the
Government must prove that the tippee knew that the corporate
insider who disclosed confidential information did so for his own
personal benefit.”135
The court rejected the Government’s argument. It explained,
“[b]y selectively parsing this dictum, the Government seeks to revive
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 444–45.
Id. at 445.
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. (citing Dirks, 463 U.S. at 600).
Id.
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the absolute bar on tippee trading that the Supreme Court explicitly
rejected in Dirks.”136 The court observed that the Government’s
“overreliance” on the court’s prior dicta merely highlighted the
“doctrinal novelty” of its recent insider trading prosecutions, which
were “increasingly targeted at remote tippees many levels removed
from corporate insiders.”137 Prior cases, by contrast, generally
involved tippees who “directly participated in the tipper’s breach
(and therefore had knowledge of the tipper’s disclosure for personal
benefit)” or tippees who were “explicitly apprised of the tipper’s gain
by an intermediary tippee.”138 The court could not find a single case
in which tippees “as remote as” the appellants had been held
criminally liable for insider trading.139
The court acknowledged it had “not yet been presented with the
question of whether the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s breach
requires knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit,” but stated that
the answer “follows naturally from Dirks.”140 For insider trading
liability, the insider’s disclosure of confidential information alone is
not a breach.141 Therefore, without establishing that “the tippee
knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange for
the disclosure,” the Government cannot meet its burden of showing
that the tippee knew of a breach.142 Specifically addressing the issue
of the benefit that may be inferred from a personal relationship, the
court stated, “such an inference is impermissible in the absence of
proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an
exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents at least a
potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”143
Thus, the court reversed the convictions. The Government
petitioned for an en banc review, but the Circuit denied it.144 The
Government then filed a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court, but
was again denied.145

136. Id.
137. Id. at 448.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 447.
141. Id. at 448.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 452.
144. United States v. Newman, Nos. 13-1837(L), 13-1917(Con), 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS
5788, at *4 (2d Cir. Apr. 3, 2015).
145. United States v. Newman, No. 15-137, 2015 U.S. LEXIS 6104, at *1 (Oct. 5, 2015).
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D. Post Newman Circuit Split
Before the Supreme Court took up Salman, some commentators
speculated that there may have been a circuit split created by the
opinions of Judge Jed Rakoff.146 Although he regularly sits in the
District Court of the Second Circuit, he recently sat by designation
on the Ninth Circuit and he alone may have created a circuit split.147
In the Second Circuit, Judge Rakoff was bound by Newman, but in
the Ninth Circuit he was not.
1. S.D.N.Y.: United States v. Gupta July 2015
Here, Rajat Gupta moved to vacate his sentence and the
judgment against him arising from his 2012 conviction of conspiracy
and securities fraud, based on the recent decision in Newman.148
Gupta had been on the board of directors of Goldman Sachs, and
there was ample evidence he had tipped his close business associate
with material nonpublic information on several occasions, following
which, his associate traded on the information.149 Gupta had argued
that Newman required that a tipper (here Gupta) receive from his
tippee a “quid pro quo” in the form of “a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature.”150 The court first
distinguished Newman, noting that Newman was a remote tippee,
whereas Gupta was a tipper.151 Next, the court reiterated the standard
it had repeatedly made clear: “a tipper is liable for securities fraud if
he takes sensitive market information provided to him in a fiduciary
capacity and exploits it for some personal benefit.”152 The court
noted that this was “precisely how the jury was instructed” in his
case, and Newman “in no way purports to change this fundamental
concept.”153
Then Judge Rakoff addressed the second holding in Newman,
upon which Gupta primarily relied:154
To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be
inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper and
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Miller, supra note 19.
Id.
United States v. Gupta, 111 F. Supp. 3d 557 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Id. at 560–61.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 560.
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tippee, where the tippee’s trades “resemble trading by the
insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the
recipient,” we hold that such an inference is impermissible
in the absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal
relationship that generates an exchange that is objective,
consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature. In other words, as
Judge Walker noted in Jiau, this requires evidence of “a
relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to
benefit the latter.155
Judge Rakoff pointed out that the use of the word “or” in the last
sentence indicated that “a tipper’s intention to benefit the tippee is
sufficient to satisfy the benefit requirement so far as the tipper is
concerned, and no quid pro quo is required.”156 On the other hand,
Judge Rakoff clarified, “so far as a remote tippee’s knowledge of that
intent is concerned, the jury, according to the Newman court, cannot
infer such knowledge from the mere fact that the remote tippee knew
that the tipper and direct tippee were friends.”157 Rather, he
explained, “to warrant such an inference in such circumstances, there
must be evidence of a ‘meaningfully close personal relationship that
generates an exchange that is objective, consequential, and represents
at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature.’”158 Judge Rakoff concluded that, in any event, the proof at
trial easily satisfied “even Gupta’s view of Newman.”159 Thus,
Gupta’s motion was denied in its entirety.160
2. Ninth Circuit: United States v. Salman July 2015
Here again, the element of personal benefit was the crucial
factor in deciding the case. In 2003, Bassam Yacoub Salman’s sister
Susan became engaged to Maher Kara, an investment banker in

155. Id. (internal citations omitted).
156. Id.
157. Id. The “friendship from college” argument was put forth by the Government in
Newman, perhaps based on success of that argument in Obus, but the Newman court invalidated it
as insufficient. The standard the Newman court set forth was more rigorous, as it added the
requirement that the tippee, no matter how remote, know of the personal benefit received by the
original tipper.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 561.
160. Id.
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Citigroup’s healthcare group.161 Over the course of the engagement,
the Kara family and the Salman family became very close. 162 In
particular, Salman and Michael Kara, Maher’s older brother, became
close friends.163 Michael had an undergraduate degree in chemistry
and often helped his younger brother, Maher, understand scientific
concepts relevant to his work in the healthcare and biotechnology
sectors.164 Between 2004 and 2007, Maher regularly and knowingly
disclosed to Michael material nonpublic information about upcoming
mergers and acquisitions, on which Michael traded.165 At the same
time, Michael shared the information with Salman and encouraged
him to “mirror-image” his trading activity.166 Salman did so, but
instead of trading through his own account, he arranged for a series
of transfers, ultimately into the account of his wife’s sister and her
husband, Bayyouk, and Salman would split the profits with them.167
From 2004 to 2007, the account grew from $396,000 to $2.1
million.168
Salman, like Newman, was a remote tippee. Under the Newman
standard of the Second Circuit, in order to prosecute Salman, the
Government would need to prove that Salman (1) knew that Maher
was the tipper and that he breached his fiduciary duty to Citigroup,
(2) knew that Maher received a personal benefit from doing so, and
(3) traded on the information anyway.169
The Government had presented evidence that Salman knew that
Maher was the tipper and had breached his fiduciary duty in tipping
the information.170 In addition, the Government had presented
evidence that Maher and Michael Kara “enjoyed a close and
mutually beneficial relationship,” which would satisfy the Newman
requirements.171 For instance, Michael helped pay for Maher’s
161. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1088–89 (9th Cir. 2015).
162. Id. at 1089.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 447 (2d Cir. 2014).
170. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1089. In fact, Michael pleaded guilty and testified for the
government that he told Salman, directly, that the information was coming from Maher. Id. On
another occasion, when Michael saw papers regarding their trades strewn about Salman’s office,
Michael became angry, and Salman agreed that they had to “protect” Maher and promised to
shred the papers. Id.
171. Id.
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college, stood in for their deceased father at Maher’s wedding, and
coached Maher on science, so that he could succeed at Citigroup.172
Maher loved his brother Michael and gave him information “to
benefit him” and “fulfill whatever needs he had.”173 On one occasion
when Michael asked for inside information because he “owed
somebody,” Maher initially offered cash, but when Michael refused
it, he eventually “gave him a tip about an upcoming acquisition
instead.”174
Moreover, the Government presented evidence that Salman was
aware of the Kara brothers’ close relationship, such as when Salman
attended Maher’s wedding and saw him weep when Michael gave a
toast, describing Maher as his “mentor” and “one of the most
generous human beings he knows.”175 Lastly, there was ample
evidence that Salman traded on the information.176
Salman had argued that under Newman, “evidence of a
friendship or familial relationship between a tipper and tippee,
standing alone, is insufficient to demonstrate that the tipper received
a benefit.”177 Salman focused on the language “indicating that the
exchange of information must include ‘at least a potential gain of a
pecuniary or similarly valuable nature,’” which Salman interpreted
as referring to the benefit received by the tipper.178 Salman argued
that because there was no evidence that Maher received “any such
tangible benefit in exchange for the inside information” or that
Salman “knew of any such benefit,” the Government failed to “carry
its burden.”179
The court responded firmly: “To the extent Newman can be read
to go so far, we decline to follow it.”180 Although at first blush, these
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1090.
176. Id. at 1089.
177. Id. at 1093.
178. Id. (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014)).
179. Id.
180. Id. In what might be considered a jab at the Newman court, Judge Rakoff began with the
same three words, “to the extent,” the Newman court used when it arguably added an evidentiary
requirement to the Dirks holding: “To the extent Dirks suggests that a personal benefit may be
inferred from a personal relationship between the tipper and tippee, where the tippee’s trades
‘resemble trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient,’ see
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 (1983), we hold that such an inference is impermissible in the
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature.” United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2d Cir. 2014).
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may sound like fighting words (and the Supreme Court must have
thought so when it granted certiorari), Judge Rakoff followed that
sentence with the weight of binding precedent: “Doing so would
require us to depart from the clear holding of Dirks that the element
of breach of fiduciary duty is met where an ‘insider makes a gift of
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.’”181 If
Salman’s theory were accepted and the evidence found to be
insufficient, Rakoff continued, then an insider would be free to
disclose material nonpublic information to her relatives, and they
would be free to trade on it, as long as she asked for no tangible
compensation in return.182 As evidenced by Justice Powell’s internal
notes, this was not the result intended by Dirks.183 The court held that
the evidence was more than sufficient to convict Salman.184
III. CRITIQUE OF EXISTING LAW
A. Is Market Efficiency Still a Valid Argument?
Justice Powell was concerned with protecting market analysts
from overzealous SEC prosecution.185 He argued that even the SEC
agreed that analysts provided a valuable service to the efficient
functioning of the markets.186 According to the SEC paper Justice
Powell was referencing, the “value to the entire market of [analysts’]
efforts cannot be gainsaid; market efficiency in pricing is
significantly enhanced by [their] initiatives to ferret out and analyze
information, and thus the analyst’s work redounds to the benefit of
all investors.”187
But in light of modern technology, where nearly unlimited
information is readily available to anyone with an internet
connection, it is worth asking if analysts’ contributions continue to

181. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1093 (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664).
182. Id. at 1094.
183. Pritchard, supra note 92, at 861 (noting that Justice Powell, who wrote Dirks, wanted to
prevent insiders from tipping the “stereotypical golfing buddy”).
184. Salman, 792 F.3d at 1094.
185. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 664 n.24 (1983) (“Without legal limitations, market participants are
forced to rely on the reasonableness of the SEC’s litigation strategy, but that can be hazardous, as
the facts of this case make plain.”).
186. Id. at 658 (“Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it could have an inhibiting
influence on the role of market analysts, which the SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the
preservation of a healthy market.”).
187. Id. at 658 n.17.
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provide a benefit to all investors.188
In exchange for this benefit, the Court essentially created a
carve-out for market analysts.189 But this policy has meant that
analysts (and their firms and clients) can reap the benefits of trading
on material nonpublic information, as long as the government cannot
prove that the tipper obtained a personal benefit and that the tippee
knew of the benefit. For example, the remote tippees in Newman
arguably knew that they had inside information regarding corporate
earnings before they were publicly released in a report.190 Newman
and others traded on the insiders’ tips and made over $70 million for
their hedge funds.191 Their convictions were reversed because the
government did not prove that the tippers received a personal benefit
or that the tippees knew of such a benefit.192 It would seem that the
lesson from this case is quite simple: the legal way to beat the market
and succeed in the financial sector is to obtain material nonpublic
information from corporate executives, share the information within
a circle of friends without telling them the source, and ensure that the
friends do the same. As long as each person trades on information
obtained by someone else, no one can be prosecuted. Considering the
current debate on income inequality, it is worth asking if this policy
is still consistent with our society’s values.
If, on the other hand, a market analyst conducts extensive
research, arrives at certain conclusions about a company’s financial
health, and profits handsomely by trading on those conclusions
without receiving material nonpublic information from an insider,
such actions are consistent with the core American ideal that hard
work will be rewarded. In such a case, it would be considered
unthinkable (or worse, communist) to expect the analyst to hand over
the fruits of the research to a trading counterparty in order to achieve
information parity. Market analysts are constantly striving for an
informational advantage over their counterparties by collecting and
analyzing publicly available data to “take advantage of pricing
188. It should be noted that even when the SEC gave credit to market analysts, seemingly
endorsing the efficiency theory, it continued to support the SEC’s overarching goal of fairness for
all investors.
189. Donald C. Langevoort, Investment Analysts and the Law of Insider Trading, 76 VA. L.
REV. 1023, 1033–34 (1990) (regarding Dirks: “The investment analyst was obviously meant to
have a deep safe-harbor.”).
190. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443–44 (2d Cir. 2014).
191. Id. at 443.
192. Id. at 455.
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inefficiencies in [a] company’s securities.”193
One technique used to gather information is “channel checking”,
which can take many forms, such as conversations with supply-side
sources or franchise outlets, aggregation of shipping data, or even
counting the cars in a Best Buy parking lot.194 Analysts can run into a
gray area, however, when they combine channel checks with
nonpublic information obtained from insiders that is ostensibly nonmaterial.195 Because the definition of materiality is so broad as to
include any information a reasonable investor would consider before
choosing to invest, analysts’ conversations with corporate insiders
can easily reveal information that later turns out to be “material.”196
This could leave the analyst with the dilemma of either scrapping all
of their research or running the risk of being prosecuted. Perhaps it is
unrealistic to expect analysts to conduct vigorous research and never
receive material nonpublic information, and thus the carve-out is an
appropriate protective measure.
B. The SEC Pursues Fairness, Despite the Supreme Court’s Explicit
Fiduciary Requirement
As a general rule, from the beginning of the SEC, its regulations
have been designed to promote full disclosure to all investors.197 This
policy played out in 2000 with the passage of SEC Regulation FD
(Fair Disclosure), which requires that issuers of securities who
disclose any material nonpublic information to one person, must
publicly disclose the information “simultaneously, in the case of an
intentional disclosure,” or “promptly, in the case of a non-intentional
disclosure.”198 With full disclosure, market participants should be
fully informed, and therefore, the pricing of securities should reflect
all of the publicly available information.199 Given this basic premise,
a companion theory has arisen that investors should have equal
access to information,200 Under this theory of equal access, “[t]rading
193. Marron C. Doherty, Note, Regulating Channel Checks: Clarifying the Legality of
Supply-Chain Research, 8 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 470, 477 (2014).
194. Id. at 478.
195. Id. at 479–80.
196. See id.
197. Thomas Lee Hazen, Identifying the Duty Prohibiting Outsider Trading on Material
Nonpublic Information, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 881, 882 (2010).
198. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2016).
199. Hazen, supra note 193, at 882.
200. Id. at 883, citing, inter alia, 65 Fed. Reg. 51716-01 (Aug. 15, 2000) (discussing the
SEC’s rationale for the need for equal access).
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securities on the basis of material nonpublic information gives the
trader an unfair advantage over other investors that runs counter to
the premise of federal securities law.”201
Although this theory of equal access and fairness dates back (at
least) to In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,202 it also appears to have
motivated many of the SEC’s recent actions, despite the Supreme
Court’s “explicit dicta that fiduciary principles underlie the offense
of insider trading.”203 An increasing number of lower courts ignored
the fiduciary dicta “when it foreclose[d] liability against a defendant
who ha[d] traded securities based on wrongfully obtained
information.”204 Indeed, lower courts may have been emboldened by
observing the Supreme Court’s willingness to stretch fiduciary
principles in order to obtain policy goals, as some contend occurred
in Chiarella, Dirks, and O’Hagan.205 Given that lower courts discard
fiduciary principles with increasing regularity, the current framework
of insider trading liability is producing inconsistent results.
Professor Nagy has recommended that when examining
gratuitous tipping, courts go beyond Dirks and consider the
misappropriation theory, Regulation FD, and state court decisions
that “construe breaches of the duty of loyalty to include not only selfdealing but also other actions taken in bad faith.”206 Professor Kim
suggested that considering insider trading as a form of private
corruption would be an improvement on the fiduciary duty model.207
When deciding Salman, the Court should consider revisiting the
fiduciary test created in Dirks.
C. Beware the Ambitious, Aggressive Prosecutor
While some government prosecutions may be motivated by the
201. Id.
202. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (“Analytically, the obligation rests on two principal elements;
first, the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and
second, the inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.” (emphasis added) (citation
omitted)).
203. Donna M. Nagy, Insider Trading and the Gradual Demise of Fiduciary Principles, 94
IOWA L. REV. 1315, 1319 (2009).
204. Id. at 1340.
205. Id. at 1339–40.
206. Donna M. Nagy, Beyond Dirks: Gratuitous Tipping and Insider Trading, Indiana Legal
Studies Research Paper No. 327 (Oct. 22, 2015), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2665820.
207. Sung Hui Kim, Insider Trading as Private Corruption, 61 UCLA L. REV. 928, 932–33
(2014).
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equal access theory, which the Supreme Court has explicitly
rejected,208 others may be motivated by personal recognition and
career advancement. For example, in 2012, U.S. Attorney Preet
Bharara, whose office prosecuted Newman, among many other high
profile cases, was named by Time magazine as one of “The 100 Most
Influential People in the World.”209 In 2011, Reed Brodsky rose to
prominence as the lead prosecutor in the trial of former Goldman
Sachs Director Rajat Gupta, and in 2016 he is making headlines for
joining the defense team for Kaye Scholer LLP partner Evan
Greebal, who is charged with securities fraud along with “pharma
bad boy” Martin Shkreli.210
Many celebrated Attorney Generals have parlayed their position
into powerful elected posts, including New York Governors Andrew
Cuomo, Elliot Spitzer and Thomas Dewey and California Governors
Jerry Brown, George Deukmejian, Pat Brown and Earl Warren. It is
not unreasonable to surmise that an aspiring government prosecutor
might bend the law to take down a high profile Wall Street player. In
the new Showtime television series Billions, where a federal
prosecutor pursues his nemesis, a hedge fund manager, both
characters are equally motivated by personal gain.211 The concern of
prosecutorial overreach in part led to Justice Powell’s formulation of
the fiduciary duty requirement in Dirks.212 In reviewing Salman, the
court should clarify the law so that prosecutors cannot stretch the law
to achieve a desirable outcome.
IV. PROPOSAL: REVISIT DIRKS AND NEWMAN
While it might be tempting to suggest that the Court create an
entirely new standard for insider trading violations when it decides
Salman, it is unlikely the Court would do so. Instead, the Court could
keep the basic framework, which is based on fiduciary duty, but
reduce one of the necessary elements to a factor to be considered and

208. United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 232–33 (1980).
209. Viet Dinh, Time 100: The List: Preet Bharara, TIME (Apr. 18, 2012), http://
content.time.com/time/specials/packages/article/0,28804,2111975_2111976_2112129,00.html.
210. Y. Peter Kang, Kaye Scholer Atty Taps Gupta Prosecutor in Shkreli Case, LAW360
(Feb. 8, 2016, 10:44 PM ET), http://www.law360.com/securities/articles/756862.
211. Kai Ryssdal, Showtime’s “Billions” Pits Wealth Against Power, MARKETPLACE (Jan.
14, 2016, 9:52 PM), http://www.marketplace.org/2016/01/12/life/billions. The show’s creators
based the prosecutor on interviews with current AUSAs, one of whom gloated over his unbridled
power. Id.
212. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 664 n.24 (1983); see supra note 185.

Fall 2016]

INSIDER TRADING LAW THAT WORKS

601

eliminate another element entirely. First, the Court should change the
personal benefit requirement established in Dirks to a personal
benefit factor. The Court has done this before, when it rejected the
strict two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test for assessing the value of an
anonymous tip regarding criminal activity, and instead adopted a
totality-of-the-circumstances test.213
Second, the Court should eliminate the requirement established
in Newman that the tippee must know of the tipper’s personal
benefit. Instead, the Court should return to the fiduciary duty
requirement before Dirks, where liability stemmed from the insider’s
breach of fiduciary duty to the corporation, regardless of whether the
insider obtained a personal benefit.214 While it is understandable that
Justice Powell examined the personal benefit of the tipper to
determine whether a tip constituted a breach of duty, it should be
considered as an important factor in assessing a breach of duty, but
not a dispositive one. This interpretation is arguably consistent with
parts of Dirks, because Justice Powell gave such an open-ended, nonexclusive set of examples of breach of fiduciary duty. 215 To highlight
the non-exclusive nature of the list of examples, certain words have
been underlined:
[T]o determine whether the disclosure itself “[deceives],
[manipulates], or [defrauds]” shareholders, the initial
inquiry is whether there has been a breach of duty by the
insider. This requires courts to focus on objective criteria,
i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect
personal benefit from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary
gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into future
earnings. There are objective facts and circumstances that
often justify an inference. For example, there may be a
relationship between the insider and the recipient that
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to
benefit the particular recipient. The elements of fiduciary
duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also exist
when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to
a trading relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble
213. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31, (1983) (“This totality-of-the-circumstances
approach is far more consistent with our prior treatment of probable cause than is any rigid
demand that specific “tests” be satisfied by every informant’s tip.”)
214. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 672–73 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 663.
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trading by the insider himself followed by a gift of the
profits to the recipient.216
The facts of Dirks were extremely unusual and Justice Powell
created a test that yielded the result he desired in that case, but the
result was inconsistent with the SEC’s goal of fairness. As Justice
Blackmun wrote in his dissent in Dirks, “[i]t makes no difference to
the shareholder whether the corporate insider gained or intended to
gain personally from the transaction; the shareholder still has lost
because of the insider’s misuse of nonpublic information.”217
Blackmun stated that the majority engrafted a “special motivational
requirement” on the fiduciary duty doctrine.218 Further, Blackmun
disagreed with Powell’s “efficiency theory,” in which “the benefit
conferred on society by Secrist’s and Dirks’ activities may be paid
for with the losses caused to shareholders trading with Dirks’
clients.”219
Blackmun interpreted the Court’s opinion to impose liability on
tippees when they know or have reason to know that the information
is material and nonpublic and was obtained through a breach of
duty.220 Justice Brennan perhaps phrased the standard better in his
concurrence in Chiarella: “a person violates § 10(b) whenever he
improperly obtains or converts to his own benefit nonpublic
information which he then uses in connection with the purchase or
sale of securities.”221 As demonstrated below, this standard would
yield results that align more closely with the SEC’s goal of fairness
for all investors, without punishing analysts who work diligently and
honestly to gain an informational advantage.
Applying this standard to Dirks, Dirks’ censure would have been
upheld. Dirks received material nonpublic information from Secrist
regarding Equity’s fraud, and Dirks surely knew or should have
known that Secrist, a former officer of the company, breached his
duty in tipping the information.222 Dirks should have kept the
information confident, but instead he shared it with his clients who
immediately sold their shares, thereby avoiding great losses. 223 Other
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

Id. (citations omitted).
Id. at 674.
Id. at 668.
Id. at 676–77.
Id. at 671 n.5.
United States v. Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 239 (1980) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
Id. at 648–49.
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investors who did not have access to such inside information were
not so lucky. This is precisely the kind of unfair advantage that led to
the creation of the SEC.224 While it may be honorable that Dirks also
helped to expose the fraud, it should not exempt him from liability
for using inside information for personal gain.225
Applying the standard to Chiarella, the “insider” who owed a
duty to the company was Chiarella himself. As an employee of the
print shop, he owed a duty to the print shop and its customers to keep
confidential any information he learned in the course of his work.
Without such a duty, every outside vendor from the cleaning staff to
the lawyers structuring the acquisition would be free to use inside
information for personal gain. The fact that Chiarella was clever
enough to deduce the identities of the corporations involved in
acquisitions should not have exempted him from liability. In
addition, this standard would yield the same result in O’Hagan,
because O’Hagan owed a duty to his law firm and to its client to
keep the acquisition information confidential and not to use it for
personal gain.
Looking to Salman, Mr. Salman would certainly be liable under
this standard because he clearly knew that he was receiving
information about corporate acquisitions in advance of public
announcements in breach of his brother-in-law’s brother’s duty to
Citigroup to keep the information confidential.226
Perhaps the most difficult application of this standard would be
to Newman. The liability of all the tippees, no matter how remote,
would depend on whether they knew or should have known that the
information was material, nonpublic and obtained through a breach
of duty. As mentioned in the discussion of the efficiency theory in
the previous section, it is conceivable that an analyst would conduct
research by speaking with corporate insiders, and in the course of the
conversation, the insider might reveal material nonpublic
information. Liability would then depend on whether the information
224. See U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM’N, supra note 37.
225. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 669 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Although the majority implied
Dirks did not gain from disclosing the information, Dirks’s firm generated approximately $25,000
in commissions as a result of the tips, as well as an enhanced reputation for “looking after” its
clients. Id.
226. United States v. Salman, 2013 WL 6655176, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2013), aff’d, 792
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2015) (“From 2004 through 2007, Maher Kara provided his brother, Mounir
“Michael” Kara with material, non-public information relating to a number of companies
Citigroup was advising in the context of potential acquisitions.”).
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was tipped in breach of a duty.
Evidence presented in Newman established that investor
relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in advance of
quarterly earnings.227 For instance, the head of Investor Relations at
Dell selectively disclosed financial information “to establish
relationships with financial firms who might be in a position to buy
Dell’s stock.”228 In such an example, the disclosure would be for the
benefit of the corporation, and therefore it would not be a breach of
duty, nor would it be improper for the tippee to obtain it. On the
other hand, selectively leaking inside information, even to establish
relationships with powerful finance firms, is in violation of
Regulation FD, and it would be a breach of duty to the corporation to
intentionally break a federal securities law.
Additional evidence in Newman established that analysts
“routinely estimate metrics such as revenue, gross margin, operating
margin and earnings per share through legitimate financial modeling
using publicly available information and educated assumptions about
industry and company trends.”229 Further evidence showed that
analysts “routinely solicited information from companies in order to
check assumptions in their models in advance of earnings
announcements.”230 For example, one of the tippees in the tipping
chain testified that he frequently ran his model past internal relations
departments and asked whether his assumptions were “too high or
too low” or in the “ball park,” which suggested analysts routinely
updated figures in advance of earnings announcements.231 If it is
determined that such information was passed to analysts for a
corporate benefit and did not constitute a breach of fiduciary duty,
there would be no tippee liability.
Newman would be an ideal case to consider a personal benefit
factor in determining whether there was a breach of fiduciary duty. If
a corporate insider received a personal benefit such as a payback or a
job offer for disclosing information, then it would tend to be more
likely it was a breach. But if the benefit accrued to the corporation, it
would tend not to be a breach, especially if the insider revealed the
information publicly in accordance with Regulation FD.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.

United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 454 (2d Cir. 2014).
Id. at 454–55.
Id. at 454.
Id.
Id.
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In applying the pre-Dirks standard to Newman, the result would
be unclear. Because there was evidence on both sides of the question
of whether there was a breach of duty when the information was
tipped, it would require the jury to determine the facts, using the
personal benefit as a factor, not a required element.
V. JUSTIFICATION FOR THE PROPOSAL
The problem with the current standard under Dirks and Newman
is that it is making it unreasonably difficult for the government to
prosecute those who willfully use material nonpublic information
obtained improperly. Mr. Salman, for instance, blatantly broke the
law and attempted to hide his actions in another person’s brokerage
account, but now he claims innocence and has appealed to the
Supreme Court, based on Newman’s holding that the government
must prove that the insider/tipper received a benefit from the tip and
that he, as the remote tippee, knew of the benefit.232 By eliminating
the personal benefit requirement from Dirks as well as Newman’s
requirement that the tippee know of the tipper’s personal benefit, and
instead using the personal benefit as a factor, not a requirement, the
Court will align the judicial framework with the objective of the SEC
to ensure fairness in the market system. In addition, this standard
would not result in absolute information parity, which would punish
market analysts for honest work.
Further, this standard would comport with what lower courts are
already doing, in terms of disregarding the fiduciary duty
requirement. Courts are likely doing this because the current standard
is unreasonably difficult for prosecutors to succeed, even when facts
demonstrate obvious violations. By using the proposed standard,
lower courts would be more likely to follow precedent, because they
could successfully convict violators. This would result in more
consistent application of the law throughout the country.
Under the current standard, courts in the Second Circuit are
bound by the stringent requirements of Newman, while courts
elsewhere are not. Defendants with identical facts prosecuted in
different circuits are subject to different interpretations of federal
law, which is untenable. The current situation also makes it difficult
for counsel to advise clients, and makes it easy for potential violators
to craft defense strategies.
232. United States v. Salman, 792 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2015).
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By implementing the new standard, the investing public would
be encouraged to participate more fully in the markets, because there
would be less concern that insiders can trade using an unfair
advantage. This would lead to greater financial rewards for all
market participants.
VI. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court reviews United States v. Salman this
year, it should take the opportunity to revisit the personal benefit
requirement created in the landmark insider trading case SEC v.
Dirks, as well as the United States v. Newman requirement that the
tippee must know of the tipper’s personal benefit. The Court should
eliminate the knowledge requirement of Newman and change the
personal benefit requirement of Dirks to a personal benefit factor.
While it is a valuable factor for determining an insider’s breach of
duty, it is not dispositive, and therefore, it should not be a required
element of a fiduciary breach.

